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Labor Market Informalization and Social Policy: Distributional Links and the Case 
of Homebased Workers 
 




Lourdes Beneria and Maria S. Floro1 
 
               ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is based on the notion that the nature of current labor market informalization 
requires rethinking in order to guide action and formulate social policies for eliminating 
poverty and reducing economic inequality and job insecurity. It explores conceptually 
and empirically the dynamics of  informality and  demonstrates  the interconnectedness 
of  job precariousness, vulnerability and gender relations.There are five related aspects to 
this process of informalization that are explored in the conceptual framework namely: 1) 
increasing labor market flexibilization; 2) the weakening (even absence) of the labor 
contract; 3) rising income inequality and worker differentiation;  4) institutional questions 
related to ownership and appropriation of production; and 5) gender-related socially 
ascribed positions in society and within the household.  
 
The empirical section is based on the 2002 sample survey data of poor urban households 
engaged in home-based work collected in Bolivia and Ecuador as part of a four-country 
research project that attempts to understand the roles of financial and labor  resources in 
the coping strategies of urban poor households as their countries undergo rapid global 
market integration, financial crises and economic restructuring. 
 Using  employment and decisionmaking information on  heads and spouses in the 
Bolivian and Ecuador sample data, the empirical investigation provides a gendered 
analysis of the informalization of employment among men and women respondents in 
couples (or dual adults) households to highlight the interconnectedness of job 
precariousness and gendered relations. Specifically, we adopt a gendered approach in  
examining the link between gender-based roles and relations with worker vulnerability.  
 
The findings in the  study  points to the importance of rethinking social protection 
program for workers laboring in informalized settings. It concludes with a discussion of 
lthe different possible avenues for action to dealing with poverty and redressing 
regressive tendencies in the distribution of income and resources in the informal 
economy. 
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This paper is based on the notion that the nature of current labor market informalization 
requires rethinking in order to guide action and formulate social policies for eliminating 
poverty and reducing economic inequality and job insecurity. It explores conceptually 
and empirically the dynamics of  informality and  demonstrates  the interconnectedness 
of  job precariousness, vulnerability and gender relations. The paper also examines 
empirically, using Bolivia and Ecuador households and individual workers sample data 
collected in 2002, the critical role of women  informal workers in household 
maintenance, social  reproduction, and social asset building (or networking), establishing 
a dialectic between these processes and women’s gender identities and roles, both as 
income earners and primary care givers.   
 
In the absence of social protection schemes, the inability of homebased, informal workers 
in poor households to insulate consumption from income risk and volatility has adverse 
consequences both for welfare distribution and for productive efficiency. Hence, the need 
to explore  carefully the types of social protection schemes that can reduce vulnerability 
and increase the bargaining power of women and their households. These include for 
example unemployment, risk and health insurance, day care and school services, and 
increased support for public education,  Equally important are gender-aware 
macroeconomic policies that generate employment, raise income levels and affect 
distributional channels between different social groups, such as through taxation, 
subsidies and other redistributive policies. A better understanding of the different  forms 
that economic insecurity takes and  of the interaction between economic opportunities 
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We also would like to acknowledge  the assistance provided by Lucia Salamea Palacios (UNIFEM –
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(REMTE and Universidad de Guayaquil) and Elisabeth Estrella (UNIFEM-Andean Region) to the Ecuador 
training workshop and conference. Sonali Duggal  and Carmen Triana deserve also our thanks for their 
generous assistance. 
   
3  Professor, Cornell  University and  Associate Professor, Vassar College and American University 
respectively. 
  
4 The first part of this paper draws rather heavily from parts of Beneria and Floro, 2003 
 3 
and gender relations that permeate economic institutions e.g. the household and the 
informal economy can help formulate, design and implement a more gender-aware social 
policy. 
 
The empirical section is based on the 2002 sample survey data of poor urban households 
engaged in home-based work collected in Bolivia and Ecuador as part of a four-country 
research project that attempts to understand the roles of financial and labor  resources in 
the coping strategies of urban poor households as their countries undergo rapid global 
market integration, financial crises and economic restructuring5.The survey instrument is 
comprehensive and involves questions on household and community characteristics as 
well as informal employment,  savings, assets, credit, and participation in household 
decision making. It also attempts to take into account the distinct  needs of women and 
men in poor households, their multiple roles and specific concerns by collecting separate 
head and spouse data on employment, savings, credit and household decision making.   
 
 
II. Dynamism of the Informal Economy: 
 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, studies on the informal sector often assumed that, with 
economic growth, it would tend to be absorbed by the modern economy. The tremendous 
growth of informality since then has reversed these expectations, pointing to the strong 
tendencies in the global economy to generate precarious jobs  below subsistence wages. 
According to   ILO estimates, informal employment represents one half to three-quarters 
of non-agricultural employment in developing countries (ILO, 2002).  Regional and 
country differences are significant but the growing importance of informality has been 
registered in high income countries as well; self-employment, part-time work, and 
temporary work represent 30 per cent of overall employment in 15 European countries 
and 25 per cent in the United States.  
 
It is well known that the increase in women’s economic participation in paid work in the 
global economy has been paralleled by processes of deregulation in the conditions of 
work. For a variety of reasons, women are disproportionately represented in informal 
employment, which, according to ILO estimates, accounts for 60 per cent or more of 
female employment in developing countries. Likewise, in 1998 women represented 60 
per cent or more of the part-time workers in all the OECD countries that reported data. In 
some labor categories such as home-based work, their participation ranges between 30 
and 80 per cent of all workers, while 80 percent of industrial homework is carried out by 
female labor (ILO, 2000). 
 
                                                 
5    The survey was conducted  as  part of a comparative study of labor market 
informalization and homebased work in Bolivia, Ecuador, Thailand and Philippines. It 
involved multi-visit interviews   and use of a  multi-topic questionnaire on 750  
households (1430 individuals comprised of household head and spouse) drawn from 15 
low-income, urban communities in the four countries during May-November 2002.  
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Since its inception, the notion of “informal sector” has been subject to debates and 
criticisms, particularly in terms of the heterogeneity and artificiality of the 
formal/informal division. The implication of the initial 1970s formulations by Keith Hart 
--published in 1973 but based on a 1971 study of urban Ghana-- and the ILO mission to 
Kenya in 1972 implied that modernization and economic growth would facilitate the 
absorption of the “informal sector” by the modern sector. By contrast, during the 1980s 
the literature emphasized the links rather than the divisions between the two sectors, 
pointing to the dependency of the modern on the informal sector as a way of lowering 
costs, thus implying that there was no incentive for the former to absorb informal 
activities  (Benería and Roldán, 1987; Portes and Castells, 1989). The 1990s saw a 
deepening of these processes and an expansion of informality, thus increasing the need to 
further understand the factors that have reversed the prediction of the initial formulation. 
Hence the continuing debates on the topic and their increasing relevance to understand 
the persistence of poverty and the increasing economic/social vulnerability in the midst of 
an expanding global economy (Rakowski, ed. 1994; De Soto, 2000; ILO, 2002).   
 
This raises questions regarding the differences between earlier and current stages of 
informalization. Have conditions changed and, if so in what way? Several observations 
can be made in this respect.6 First, since the 1980s, the macroeconomic context has 
changed significantly due to the implementation of neoliberal policies in many countries, 
including the Philippines, Ecuador and Bolivia. Privatization, market de-regulation and 
economic restructuring have contributed to set up the conditions for an expansion of 
informal activities and precarious working conditions. We provide specific examples 
related to Bolivia and Ecuador in subsequent sections. 
 
 Second, the expansion and deepening of markets has extended the links, direct or 
indirect, between formal and informal activities while the distinction between the two has 
become increasingly blurred. Large firms have developed, directly or indirectly, 
increasing links with informalized production through outsourcing and subcontracting. 
This trend  has been examined by several studies in the case of Thailand and the 
Philippines as well as from Latin America (Boonmathya et al, 1999, Balakrishnan and 
Huang 2001; Pérez-Sainz, 1994 and 2000; Buechler 2002).  Nevertheless, as argued 
below, many other forms of informal work remain disconnected from the more formal 
productive activities, particularly those related to survival activities. 
 
Third, informal activities are no longer viewed as the anomaly that eventually will 
disappear. On the contrary, the trend has been the opposite; the decline in formal 
employment, particularly in the public sector, and the dynamism of the informal economy 
in many cases has enhanced the relative attractiveness and the predominance of the latter.  
 
Fourth, although the traditional association of informal work with low skills and low 
productivity still holds, the last two decades have introduced many changes in this 
respect. With the increase in outsourcing and subcontracting under globalization, several 
segments of  informal activities have their center of gravity in the core firms that generate 
                                                 
6 1 An elaboration of some of these points can be found in Benería, 2001. 
 5 
them. This implies that their levels of productivity can be high and competitive, 
particularly because technology transfers and skills can take place through these linkages. 
 
 Fifth, increased  informality and the deterioration of working conditions in developing 
countries during the past two decades have taken place in a climate that has emphasized 
citizenship, political rights, individual agency, and democracy. Hence the contradictions 
and social tensions between these discourses emphasizing empowerment and equality on 
the one hand, and the realities of precariousness, poverty, and powerlessness associated 
with informality on the other.  Globalization has intensified these tensions by enlarging 
their scope and sphere of reference, and by contributing to the factors that generate 
informality. 
 
As a result, nonstandard forms of employment have multiplied, thereby introducing a 
greater diversity in situations and working life patterns for both men and women.   There 
is wide variation in the range of activities, skills requirement and the working conditions  
under which  these workers operate. 
 
These changes have raised new questions about how to best re-conceptualize the informal 
economy in order to understand its nature and consequences. In this paper we want to 
further this discussion by focusing on the distributional aspects of informalization. There 
have been recent efforts to expand the concept of informality and to rethink  its nature 
and functions from a socio-economic perspective. The ILO analysis, for example, 
emphasizes an “expanded concept” of the informal sector by introducing the notion of 
“informal economy” in order to “incorporate in this concept the whole of informality –
including both enterprise and employment relations—as manifested in industrialized, 
transition, and developing economies.” (ILO, 2002: 11). The objective is “to incorporate 
the real world dynamics in labor markets today –particularly the employment 
arrangements of low-income workers.”  The ILO analysis proceeds with a detailed list of 
what is or is not part of the informal economy by focusing on specific activities and on 
the characteristics and measurement of informal employment. However, it does not deal 
with the distributional dimensions that we want to emphasize in this paper. 
 
Low earnings and precarious working conditions associated with informal labor can be 
attributed to economic, institutional, and socio/political factors. For orthodox economic 
analysis, low earnings are explained by the dynamics of labor supply and demand –more 
specifically, on an abundant labor supply relative to existing demand. In addition, low 
earnings are explained through the prevalence of low labor skills and low productivity. 
Insufficient labor demand can result from scarcity of local capital a la De Soto (2000) 
reinforced by the inability of many developing countries to attract foreign investment.  
 
Thus, within an orthodox neoclassical model, the low earnings and precarious working 
conditions associated with informality represent a labor market “equilibrium” that can 
only change to the extent that these explanatory factors can. But what if this “market 
equilibrium” generates below subsistence incomes and working conditions that 
undermine human capabilities? Further, what if it does not provide for a life that is 
worthy of the dignity of every human being, as the human development approach would 
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have it? This is in fact the grim situation for a large proportion of the population in 
Ecuador as the empirical section of this paper will illustrate. It is in this context that we 
provide an analytical framework that highlights the distributional dimensions  as well as  




 III. Towards a Conceptual Framework of Distribution and Informalization of 
Work 
 
The growing labor market informalization  can be viewed as   part of the overall 
regressive process of redistribution associated with neoliberal policies and globalization. 
It functions as one of the channels through which capital has been able to lower labor 
costs, and it has contributed to the growth of precarious jobs  and increasing labor market 
insecurity. The result has been, as many authors have already pointed out, the erosion of 
the bargaining power of labor relative to capital. There are five related aspects to this 
process namely: 1) increasing labor market flexibilization; 2) the weakening (even 
absence) of the labor contract; 3) rising income inequality and worker differentiation;  4) 
institutional questions related to ownership and appropriation of production; and 5) 
gender-related socially ascribed positions in society and within the household.  
 
1)  Much has been written during the past quarter century about labor market 
deregulation and flexibilization. The rapid integration of national markets and the global 
economy through trade and financial market liberalization and the accelerated 
competition among firms have contributed to the increasing share of the market requiring 
a flexible labor force that can be redeployed, and contracted quickly during periods of 
expansion, and can be maintained “at arms length” at little or no cost during periods of 
slump (Elson 1996). The manner by which the informal economy facilitates and 
reinforces labor market flexibilization can take different forms and operate through 
different channels. 
 
In the case of Bolivia and Ecuador, the informal economy has evolved in such a way that 
it has not resulted in an increasing number of global firms and domestic enterprises being 
involved directly with workers outside the “traditional workplace” through the process of  
outsourcing and subcontracting. Indirectly,  the informal economy, as with the household, 
performs a vital function in social reproduction of labor including those employed in the 
formal, market economy. For their part,  informal shopkeepers, traders, artisans, manual 
workers and vendors provide goods and services at very low prices by charging very low 
mark-ups in their product and/or low wages for their labor. This helps reduce the cost of 
living for lower-income workers thus lowering the cost of social reproduction and. at the 
same time, distribution costs of goods produced at the formal economy –a typical 
situation in times of economic crisis. Thus, in both countries, the informal economy has 
played a “survivalist role” which, in the case of Bolivia, was symbolized  by the new 
entrants into the sector when the mines closed down. 
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In other countries, formal sector firms have been able to tap into the seemingly abundant 
supply of labor, including a large proportion of women workers, by creating new forms 
of “putting out systems” whereby workers produce goods or perform tasks in their homes 
(Benería and Roldán 1987; Portes and Castells 1989; Hsiunh 1996; Prugl 1999; Carr, 
Chen and Tate 2000; Freeman 2000). This has led to the evolution of adaptive 
mechanisms such as the vertical and horizontal chains of production networks, such as in 
garments, footwear, toys, consumer goods and handicraft industries. Production is carried 
out by multi-layered networks of parent firms, subsidiaries, contractors, subcontractors 
and homebased-workers that make finished goods for buyers across the world (Gereffi 
1998; Chen et al, 2000). 
 
It is through these varied interlinkages between the formal, informal and care (household) 
economies and the resulting diverse production arrangements that allow owners and 
managers of  capital/firms to maintain a fluid and adaptable labor force that they can tap 
during periods of expansion and lay off during periods of slump. It also enables them to 
maintain a high degree of “veiled” competition among workers that regulates wages and 
disciplines the workers in the formal market economy.  The fluidity of movement by 
labor between the formal economy, the informal economy and the household (care) 
economy is part of our analytical model which shows how owners of labor input  (and 
their households) are fully responsible for their own survival and reproduction when 
demand conditions change. 
 
Fig. 1a and 1b depict this fluidity and overlap; Fig. 1b shows how, during economic 
crises, the informal and care economy expand to pick up the slack of the formal 
economy. Firms can continue to hire and lay off workers in order to adjust labor input 
with less resistance from labor, thus providing maximum flexibility for capital. At the 
same time, many governments, including Bolivia and Ecuador, have adopted labor laws 
that tolerate and even promote labor flexibility without much concern about safety nets 
and unemployment compensation schemes during periods of high unemployment and 
underemployment.  Global competition has generated the typical race to the bottom or the 
weakening of labor protections even in countries with strong welfare states. It is therefore 
not surprising to find a wide range of informal sector activities. As argued below, a basic 
distinction is between subsistence or survival work --as with most street vending-- and 
that linked to a process of accumulation --such as organized garbage picking, 
subcontracted garment homeworking, and packaging. Many of these activities remain 
“excluded” or “marginalized,” operating in the market fringes to meet the evolving 
demand among the growing impoverished middle and low-income classes for cheaper, 
more affordable food, basic commodities and services ranging from haircuts to food 
vending. 
 
[Figures 1a and 1b about here.] 
 
2) The weakening and individualization of the labor contract is a consequence of this 
flexibilization, resulting from market forces and reinforced by labor market deregulation 
and the diminishing bargaining power of labor, either individually or collectively 
through, for example, the absence or decreasing power of unions. In many ways, 
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informalization  highlights the unequal nature of the labor/capital exchange. The owner 
of labor is free in the sense that he/she can accept or reject work, move from one firm to 
another, and even from one sector to another, but ultimately, he/she takes responsibility 
for her or his own survival and reproduction (Foley and Michl 1999).  As   authors 
writing within the Marxian tradition have often pointed, this generates an asymmetric  
dependency of labor on the employment-creating capacity of capital, thereby  creating 
unequal exchange between sellers and buyers of labor.   
 
In addition, the individualization of contracts undermines the possibility of programs 
which are built on solidarity in the form of cross-subsidies between different categories 
of labor –whereby the lower wage worker makes lower contributions than higher income 
workers despite getting similar benefits. 
 
In the case of informal but self-employed labor in which there is no labor contract per se,  
as in the case of self-employed work in micro-enterprises, labor weakness results from 
the insecurity and precariousness in which these firms operate in the market. As the 
subsequent empirical analysis will illustrate, these firms and their workers also contribute 
to market flexibilization by quickly adapting to market conditions, for example through 
the use of family labor that can be brought in and out of production at much ease or 
though absorbing costs of production (such as in the case of electric costs). 
 
Neoclassical theory tells us that the market forces of demand and supply determine the 
wage level and labor earnings.  It, however, does not emphasize the importance of the 
relative degree of competition among the suppliers of labor which affect the workers’ 
relative bargaining power; informalization shifts labor from the more formal to the less 
formal processes of production, thus increasing competition between formal and informal 
workers as well as among the informalized workers. Labor earnings are also influenced 
by the employing firms ‘ control of local markets, at least in the short run. On the other 
hand, returns to capital are also regulated by the vagaries of competition and the ability of 
its owners or managers not only to take the initiative in employment creation but also to 
induce technological change that increases productivity  and saves labor inputs, therefore 
keeping their costs low. 
 
Finally, there are institutional arrangements that  contribute to the wage formation and 
income received, including varied forms of disciplining labor such as individualization of 
labor contracts –less conducive to unionization and collective bargaining-- and the use of 
informal, contingent labor force unprotected by labor laws and social protection schemes. 
While the so-called new “psychological contract” and “boundaryless workplace” have 
tended to diminish the power of labor overall (Stone 2001), these tendencies are 
intensified under the conditions prevalent in the informalized workplace. In this sense, 
informalization tends to reinforce the relative advantage of capital over labor, at the same 
time setting the parameters under which self-employed labor operates. 
 
3). One consequence of the different processes associated with informalization has been 
the tendency to rising income inequality and worker differentiation. Although firm 
hierarchies have been flattened in many cases, the economic distance between the top and 
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bottom workers has tended to increase. The growing informalization of jobs alongside 
stagnant growth or decline of regular, core, protected jobs  has often meant that   
employment adjustments under economic restructuring concentrate the burden of shift on 
those workers who either become unemployed or become part of  the “periphery” –
including  contingent work such as with casual, part-time or subcontracted labor. It also 
shifts some costs of adjustments associated with market volatility and fluctuation onto the 
unpaid workers engaged in household  maintenance and reproduction of both the 
“reserved” unemployed and “periphery” workers.   
 
 These processes undermine the bargaining power of workers and make the maintenance 
and enforcement of workers’ rights and labor standards more difficult. This  enables 
owners and managers of capital  to reap higher returns and/or to absorb lesser risk. For 
many workers, this has generated increasing risk and economic and social vulnerability. 
It is therefore not surprising that we have observed growing inequalities between owners 
of capital and owners of labor input and also among workers themselves. At the same 
time, this has implications for the relative vulnerability of the different groups of workers 
to job loss and joblessness. 
 
Gender becomes a major axis of differentiation around these processes of adjustment. 
Increased wage dispersion has been   registered across  skills, age, sectors and ethnicity 
(Wood 1991; Freeman and Katz 1993; Fontana and Wood 2000; Standing 2000). For 
instance, those with high skills,   high-end jobs and/or employed in expanding sectors are 
likely to earn higher, if not rising, wages while those with less skills, work in low-end 
jobs and/or employed in displaced sectors are likely to face low, if not declining real 
wages. Female workers tend to earn lower wages than their male counterparts as a result 
of discrimination and gender norms that permeate in economic and social institutions, but 
we have also observed increasing income differentiation among women (McCrate 1995; 
Lavinas 1996). Workers who are hired on a casual, subcontracted or part-time basis and 
who have little or no labor protection are likely to earn less and have less benefits than 
those with regular, full-time jobs. Workers with means of expressing their voice in 
collective bargaining are likely to earn more than those without. This reinforces  the 
growing division within labor and increased differentiation in economic well-being 
among the working population.  
 
The result of these tendencies has contributed to the wide disparity of income distribution 
and social inequalities observed across countries   –and to the persistence of poverty amid 
plenty. Informal labor prevails among the world’s 6 billion people who live on less than 
$1 a day, and poverty has been increasing in many areas (World Bank, 2000/01). Hence, 
the importance of focusing on informal labor to deal with inequality. As argued in  the 
World Bank report, the distribution of income is an important factor in dealing with 
poverty: “Other things being the same, growth leads to less poverty reduction in unequal 
societies than in egalitarian ones” (p. 55). Further, the report dismisses the often 
mentioned assumption that inequality stimulates individual initiative and fosters 
competitive and entrepreneurial spirit. In fact, based on a sample of 65 developing 
countries, the report   argues that: a) high inequality reduces the possible impact of a 
given rate of economic growth, and b) lower inequality can increase efficiency and 
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economic growth. It is our contention that, given the increasing importance of the 
informal economy, it is key in  dealing with distribution and therefore with poverty. 
    
4)  Institutional factors including the market and mode of ownership play an important 
role in the distribution of resources and income. Distribution is about “who gets what,” 
not simply a question of how much people earn but how it is earned. The latter involves 
the identification of “who” owns what factor of production and the basis for the returns 
that the “owner” receives for their use. It requires an understanding of the channels of 
distribution, including how the “owners” of factors of production relate to those who 
depend on them for employment.  Since, for a given level of output, wages and profit 
income share the value added from production, the owners of capital and labor find 
themselves at opposite sides of the equation; institutional factors have an influence over 
the ways in which this distributions is shaped.  
 
During the past three decades, privatization programs and the emphasis on market 
solutions to resource allocation have fostered private ownership while muting any 
discussion on alternative forms of ownership. The overwhelming imposition of neoliberal 
policies has discouraged the analysis of the links between ownership of factors of 
production and the distribution of income/resources, bargaining power and risk. Perhaps 
it’s time to resume this debate,7 and to connect it to our understanding of informality.  
 
Privatization programs across countries have represented an enormous shift of ownership 
of resources from public to private hands. Although public ownership in the past might 
have created problems of democratic control and efficiency, it is clear that the shift of 
resources to private hands takes away the possibility of an improved democratic 
management of collective resources. With weak and often undeveloped fiscal systems, 
many governments in developing countries have been left with no revenue   to deal with 
social expenditures, contributing to the inability of the state to provide social protection 
and public services under increasing informalization. In addition, privatization programs 
have contributed to the accumulation of capital  in large firms and powerful financial 
interests, often at the level of TNCs, which have often profited enormously from the 
transfer of ownership into private hands (Hovey, 1996), leaving the large proportion of 
the population increasingly into informalized employment –and thus contributing to 
growing inequalities. 
 
At the level of the informal economy, a focus on distribution requires an institutional 
analysis of the prevailing forms of production and distribution. This can help explain the 
pervasive heterogeneity of informalized activities --in terms of earnings and social 
composition and of the degree of vulnerability and bargaining power of informal 
workers. Far from being uniform, the informal economy parallels its formal counterpart 
in terms of organizational forms and capital/labor divides. For example, the predominant 
modes fall at least in four main categories: a) the use of hired labor in a typically 
capitalist firm ; b) self-employment and the use of family labor; c) cooperative forms of 
                                                 
7 In fact there are many indications that questions regarding inequality and distribution are being asked 
even in unexpected quarters. See for example the article by Niall Ferguson, “Full Marx,” Financial Times 
8/17/02, an application of marxian class analysis to the post-Enron era. 
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production; and d) hybrid forms combining different institutional and distributional 
arrangements.  
 
The presence of these different production arrangements in the informal economy has 
been analyzed quite extensively (Benería and Roldán, 1987; Portes and Castells, 1989; 
ILO 2002; Rossell 2002; Freeman 2000). A large proportion of the labor working in 
precarious and informalized activities in developing countries fall under #b and #d 
categories. At a more basic level, and as noted earlier, it is important to distinguish 
between activities that represent subsistence or survival work and those that are 
connected to a process of accumulation. The first include some of the poorest social 
groups, surviving for example on the meager sales that street vending can generate.  
Likewise, some micro-enterprises can barely provide returns for survival. The second 
include a variety of forms of production that range from those that manage to become 
self-sustaining firms to successful sources of accumulation. The same can be said for 
cooperative forms of production. 
 
Wage labor in informalized settings is also subject to variations related to labor 
conditions such as the type of work (time or piece work, part time or full time, with or 
without contract),  the form of employment (direct contact with employer, 
subcontracting, family member, etc.), the legal/illegal divides  (minimum wages paid vs. 
various degrees of illegality for example),  and market destination (local, 
regional/nationals, foreign, or combinations among them). Income distribution reflects 
the differences between these various arrangements and between wage income and 
hybrid forms of payment to labor. It also reflects the surplus income generated by self-
employment and the ownership of means of production on the other.   
 
Thus, the nature of payments received by the workers is affected by their placement in 
the different productive forms and by their relative bargaining power. Those with few 
labor resources and assets and also dependent on the employer for raw materials, 
equipment and other inputs are likely to have less bargaining power than those who own 
capital, equipment and other resources. Workers with low skill levels, short work 
contracts and/or dependent on a single contractor or employer may be especially 
vulnerable, and their low bargaining power is likely to affect their incomes and working 
conditions. The variability in all the above factors explains the fact that the informal 
economy can also include a very dynamic and high earnings sector. 
 
5) Finally, certain groups of workers, by virtue of their work location as well as socially- 
ascribed positions in society and within the household, may have lesser bargaining power 
over their earnings and over the conversion of their income into particular functionings 
including economic security. The relationship between income and capability is an 
important subject that Sen and others have explored extensively (Sen 1992; Nussbaum 
2003). It is one that is strongly affected by ownership of assets, level of education, age 
(e.g. child workers or older workers), location (working at home or with others in a 
workplace), gender and by other parameters. Some of these factors are not clearly 
tangible, such as self-esteem, ability to be assertive and consciousness about one’s own 
interests. Some of them are highly related to gender constructions. Given their isolation 
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and, to the extent that they are mostly women, home-based workers tend to be at the low 
end of the labor hierarchy and of income scales.4 They are also likely to have little or no 
employment security and are more vulnerable to the fluctuations of flexible markets.  
 
 Whether or not a worker  is able to translate his/her earnings into capability functioning 
also depends upon the structure of  household relations and decision making processes 
and not just on the terms of employment,  level of earning and  its variability. Each 
worker allocates his/her labor between production for own subsistence and reproduction 
and participation in market production. As feminists have often pointed out, at the 
fundamental level, women’s  role in the labor market is linked to their role in household 
work and social reproduction, but in ways that are neither uniform nor straightforward. 
Home based work in particular, enables women to resolve the contradictions between 
women’s socially defined roles as wives,  mothers, and daughters on the one hand and the 
demand for cheap, flexible labor needs of capitalist economic growth on the other. This 
form of employment reconciles the productive and reproductive roles such as childcare 
and market work thereby maintaining the notion that the “ owner of labor is free in the 
sense that he/she can accept or reject work and even from sector to another…but 
ultimately, he/she takes responsibility for her/his survival and reproduction’’ (Foley and 
Michl 1999).  
 
Thus, it is no surprise then that, first, women are disproportionally represented among 
home based workers across countries and, second, home based work has increased in all 
regions (Benería 2001). In the following section, we explore the key dimensions of 
economic insecurity and worker vulnerability   in Bolivia and Ecuador. We first examine 
how neoliberal economic policies imposed on the government of Ecuador and the 
resulting rapid market integration into the global economy has led to the growth in the 
precariousness of jobs and increased vulnerability of those with little or no resources 
(other than their own labor) to help smoothen their consumption. We further 
demonstrates the “spillover” mechanisms through which insecurity associated with 
informality of work shift some elements of market risk and volatility onto the household 
and their members, particularly women.  Intrahousehold dynamics, particularly power 
relations and household division of labor, are important in assessing the distribution of 
the risk burden among members of the household.  
 
 
IV Growth in the Informal Economy: Ecuador and Bolivia 
  
The expansion of the informal economy in Ecuador in the last two decades was facilitated 
by the pattern of economic growth and structural change that resulted in the formal 
market economy’s incapacity to generate adequate jobs.  Ecuador began its 
industrialization in the 1970’s with the inflow of new petrodollars from its oil sector that 
facilitated the import of industrial inputs.  But this process of industrialization was not 
“inclusive” nor was it sustainable. (CELA 2002, p. 10, Weinberg 2002, p 10). 
Industrialization was heavily capital intensive and generated relatively little employment 
growth. By the early 1980’s, a serious balance of payments problems took on a crisis 
proportions, ushering in an IMF-led stabilization and structural adjustment program in 
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1982-84 as well as in 1988-90 (Floro 1992). The elements of the stabilization and 
structural adjustment policy package brought about the following trade, monetary, fiscal 
and labor policy measures: reduction in tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports 
and exports, interest rate liberalization, income tax system reform that lowered and 
unified tax rates, increase in indirect taxes, reduction in government expenditures, and 
labor market flexibility (World Bank 1988, 1990, 1991). The latter took the form of: a 
)reduction  of mandatory employment stability to all activities, b)  wage setting at market 
determined levels, and c) abolition of firm obligation of firms to pay workers on strike 
(World Bank 1988, 1991).  
 
The deepening of trade and financial liberalization policies in the 1990s brought about a 
pattern of uneven development characterized by unbalanced  growth of the productive 
sectors, greater concentration of wealth and deteriorating working conditions. Although 
total exports nearly doubled from 1990 to 1997, the value of imports tripled in the same 
period. The dramatic growth of exports appeared to have occurred at the expense of 
production for the domestic market, as domestic sales of the enterprise sector increased at 
a lower rate than its exports.  At the same time, the composition of imports favored 
consumer goods at the expense of productive inputs and capital goods (CELA 2002).  
 
The increase in interest rates  spurred speculation and has led to concentration of credit in 
favor of the large and medium- sized firms. Between 1995 and 1999, one percent of 
borrowers received 63 percent of the total volume of formal sector credit (CELA 2002, p. 
31). These same companies, in 1998, employed only 3.5% of the economically active 
population (EAP) or about 35 percent of workers in all registered (formal sector) firms 
(Weinberg 2002).  The total number of employees in all registered firms  in 1999 was 
only 318,411 representing  less than 8 % of EAP.  
 
Thus the rapid integration of Ecuador’s economy into the global market through trade 
and financial market liberalization and the accelerated competition among firms has 
contributed to the increasing share of its productive sectors  requiring, as argued above, a 
flexible labor force that can be redeployed, and contracted quickly during periods of 
expansion, and can be maintained “at arms length” at little or no cost during periods of 
slump. This requires transforming the way production is organized in general, and the 
manner in which labor is hired in particular. Hence, additional measures to increase labor 
flexibility and export competitiveness were incorporated in the Ecuador labor code in the 
early 1990s. Among the measures introduced were the use of temporary, part-time, 
seasonal and hourly contracts and the replacement of indefinite labor contracts with 
fixed-term contracts. These hiring schemes avoided an increase in the firm’s core or 
regular personnel payroll. At the same time,  reforms increased restrictions on the right to 
strike, collective bargaining and the organization of workers. Only one union is permitted 
in public-sector workplace and the number of workers necessary to form a union has been 
doubled (CELA 2002; Weinberg 2002). 
 
Thus, the dramatic expansion of Ecuador’s informal economy in the last decade took 
place in the context of a severe macroeconomic and financial crisis in late 1990s as well 
as persistently high income inequality and poverty. While Latin America as a whole has 
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extremely high inequality compared with other parts of the world, Ecuador’s inequality is 
accompanied by low per capita income. The Gini index of income inequality increased 
from 52 to 54 between 1995 and 1999 (Parendekar, Vos and Winkler 2002). Using a  
consumption-based poverty measure for 1999, the extreme poor accounted for 21% of the 
total population (12.4 million) and the poor accounted for 52 percent of the population  
(UNDP 2003)8. At the end of 1999, the minimum wage, in real terms was 40 percent of 
its 1980 value in sucres. By 2001, after Ecuador adopted the US dollar as its currency 
(called dollarization), the real minimum wage was reduced to 20 percent of its 1980 value 
(CELA 2002).  
 
Open unemployment increased during the period 1989-99, with women’s and men’s 
unemployment reaching  14.4 percent and 19.6 percent respectively (UNDP 2002, ILO 
2002). But it was significantly worse  among the poor. The poorest 20% of the population 
saw unemployment rates increase to 24% in 1999, while that of the richest 20% hovered 
around 5 percent throughout the period. At the same time, underemployment remained at 
about 60% of the economically active population. (CELA 2002). 
 
The Ecuadorian government response to the economic crisis that unfolded rapidly 
beginning in 1998 was not only limited and ineffective in offsetting the adverse social 
and economic consequences, but further sustained  macroeconomic deterioration and 
negative effects on in human development. Its decision to adopt the  US dollar as its 
currency resulted in high inflation and further reduced the purchasing power of household 
incomes(Solimano 2002). Ecuador’s overall vulnerability to external shocks did not 
decline; if anything, the real economy has become more sensitive to the effects of such 
shocks without the short-term cushion –albeit imperfect – that used to be provided by 
exchange rate and monetary adjustments. 
 
 The imposed fiscal austerity measures by international financial institutions and 
regressive taxation system  combined with  lack of political will have led to inadequate, 
ill-funded and poorly designed social protection schemes ranging from the  Bono 
Solidario, an innovative cash-transfer  system  targeted to poor households to school 
meals program and the provision integrated early childhood care and expanded prenatal 
and neonatal programs (Parandekar, Vos, and Wilbur 2002). Practically no flexibility 
exists, budget-wise and in program design, to expand them in scope, type and degree of 
protection when they are needed. Several new social program initiatives such as 
employment programs  never materialized at all and others, such as an education voucher 
program, only got to be implemented in late 2001. Only a small proportion of the 
population had access to the social security system. Those that do such as the 
beneficiaries of the pension scheme suffered huge losses as the purchasing power of their 
monthly benefits declined drastically. To compound the problem, social spending 
decreased by more than a third, as public spending on social services and social programs 
fell from US $78 to US$51 per person between 1995 and 20009. Ecuador’s level of social 
                                                 
8 A household is classified to be extremely poor if its total consumption expenditure is below that of t he 
food poverty line. 
9  Social public spending includes central government spending on education, health, social welfare, 
housing and urban development, labor and employment programs and from 1999, the cash transfer 
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health services were reduced as medicines and supplies ran short and as medical 
personnel suffered delays in their salary payments. 
 
CELA’s study (2002) shows a rising trend in informal sector employment during the 
period 1998-2000 as with ILO Key Indicators of the Labor Market (KILM) data  during  
the period 1990-1997/98.10 Both studies show similarly fluctuating trends through most 
of the decade. However, the growth of working-age population and of the labor force 
participation rate, particularly for women, indicated a general increase in informal sector 
employment. 
 
In the case of Bolivia, the dramatic expansion of the informal economy during the past 
two decades resulted from deep economic restructuring and the neoliberal reforms which 
began in the early 1980s and were intensified with the structural adjustment program 
(SAP) adopted in 1985. Throughout the 1970s, rising foreign debt and the fall of export 
commodity prices generated an economic crisis that peaked during the first half of the 
1980s. The crisis manifested itself in negative growth rates, hyperinflation, and declining 
value of the Bolivian peso. By 1985, the inflation rate had reached levels way above 
1000%,11 with debt service representing 45-50% of GDP (Morales Anaya 1987). GDP 
declined every year between 1981 and 1986 and country’s currency collapsed (Malloy 
and Gamarra 1988). This situation led to the adoption of the IMF-sponsored structural 
adjustment program in 1985 which resulted in the “new economic policy” (NEP).  
 
The 1985 policies were a typical SAP package that focused on structural reforms; it 
redefined the role of the government, turned the economy towards a free market direction 
through liberalization of both the goods and labor markets, and promoted opening to the 
rest of the world. Typically, it imposed wage freezes, reduction of government spending, 
and a shift towards an export oriented model of development. At the same time, the 
1980s saw the closing of the tin mines that had been a key export sector in Bolivia’s 
history and had provided a source of secure employment and a way of life for an 
important proportion of the working population. This led not only to social upheaval but 
also to a rapid relocation of the mining population which began in February of 1986. By 
May 1987, the number of “relocalizados” were estimated at 23,000, twice the amount 
foreseen in the government’s Rehabilitation Plan (McFarren, 1989) 
 
The NEP was successful in terms of reducing inflation, lowering government deficits, 
and resuming economic growth, although at a high social cost resulting from “a severe 
and painful adjustment” (Horton, Kanbur and Mazumdar 1994). Unemployment rates 
                                                                                                                                                 
program, Bono Solidario. It does not include social security benefits or special social funds such as 
solidarity fund. It also does not cover social spending by local governments; this tends to be very small in 
size relative to the central government budget. 
 
10 The figures cited in CELA’s study tend to be lower than those given by other studies. This discrepancy is 
due to the use of different data sources as well as the use of different definitions of the informal sector. 
 
11 In fact, prices increased by 20,000 per cent from August 1984 to August 1985, and by 60,000 per cent 
between May and August 1985 (Sachs 1987). These represent the highest inflation rates in Latin American 
history and one of the highest in the world. 
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grew to 25 percent in 1987 and per capita income declined rapidly (UNITAS 1987).The 
loss of public and private employment generated a substantial increase in the proportion 
of the population working in the informal economy; as workers lost their jobs, and in the 
absence of unemployment compensation, their only way out was to become self-
employed, engaging either in the most precarious forms of survival activities or in 
different types of microenteprises which in fact were promoted very actively by 
government policies, international agencies, NGOs and credit schemes (Arbona 2001). 
Given the inability of the economy to absorb the newly arrived migrants, they found a 
refuge in the urban informal markets. 
 
These tendencies were fed by a rapid process of urbanization which accompanied the 
shift of the population from mining and agricultural areas to the urban centers of the 
central corridor. Between 1976 and 1992, the population in urban areas grew by 4 % per 
annum, with similar figures through the end of the 1990s (Republic of Bolivia 2001). The 
population of El Alto, a de facto annex to the city of La Paz, grew from 11,000 in 1950 to 
almost a quarter million in 1985, and it reached a level close to 650,000 in 2001.  
(Arbona and Kohl, forthcoming). El Alto has become the quintessential indigeneous and 
“informal city,’ with the great majority of its inhabitants surviving from work in micro-
enterprises, street vending and other types of informal work taking place either in El Alto 
or in La Paz. Similar trends can be observed in other cities such as Santa Cruz, even if to 
a lower degree.12 
 
 The marked tendency towards increasing labor market informalization in Bolivia was 
intensified with the 1994 Law of Popular Participation which included several 
components emphasizing administrative and fiscal decentralization, privatization, 
educational reform, and restructuring of the country’s social insurance system, among 
others (Kohl 1999; Beneria-Surkin 2003). The economy went through a period of 
recovery during the 1990s and economic growth was primarily based on the performance 
of capital-intensive sectors, such as electricity, transportation and financial services, 
which achieved annual growth rates in excess of 4.5%, as compared with growth in other 
more labor-intensive sectors such as manufacturing (3.8%) and agriculture (2.5%) 
(Republic of Bolivia 2001).  
 
This implied that growth was achieved with insufficient job creation,  resulting in the 
persistence of unemployment and underemployment. Other chronic problems also 
reappeared: the economy has been stagnant since 1999, with an annual growth rate of 1.6 
per cent between 1998 and 1902 while the urban population has increased at 3.7 per cent 
annually (UDAPE 2003). The current conditions are typified by high unemployment 
rates, government deficits, and foreign debt pressures, as well as critical levels of poverty 
and significant disparities in regional economic growth. Under these circumstances, the 
informal economy has continued to absorb a large part of the growing workforce.  
 
                                                 
12 Santa Cruz, which has surpassed La Paz as the largest city in Bolivia, has a dynamic informal economy 
that is very visible in the center of the city –in the form of markets and street vending. However, it does not 
have the high density of informal activities that are so prevalent in La Paz (Beneria and Schaller, 2002). 
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As in the case of Ecuador, the process of adjustment in Bolivia has resulted in a higher 
level of integration with the global economy but under unfavorable conditions. Exports 
depend on a few primary commodities and the economy has not diversified with new 
products able to compete in global markets. Bolivia continues to be the poorest country in 
Latin America, with GDP per capita of $936 in 2001 ($2300 on a PPP basis). Income 
inequality figures are high, with a Gini coefficient above 0.60.Throughout the 1990s, 20 
percent of the poorest population accounted for 4 per cent of aggregate urban income, 
while the 20 percent of the highest income levels accounted for 54 percent (Republic of 
Bolivia 2001). A 1999 Inter-American Development Bank study found that the highest 
incidence of poverty was related to four factors: indigenous populations, the unemployed, 
low educational levels, and recent rural-urban migration (Gray Molina et al 1999).   
 
During the 1990s, the absolute number of households below the poverty line increased 
even though there was a relative decrease from 53.3% to 47.8% between 1990 and 1995 
(Republic of Bolivia 2001, UDAPE 2003). With the economic deterioration since 1999, 
poverty levels have continued to remain high, the number of people below the poverty 
line increased again, and income inequality has risen. At present, the large majority of the 
population is engaged in informal activities, with estimates reaching a level above 67 per 
cent. One key issue in the case of Bolivia --very relevant  for our study-- is that the 
impact of growth on poverty is low because growth has concentrated on high productivity 
sectors which absorb less than 10 per cent of the population. In any case, the lack of 
detailed statistical information about the informal economy remains a problem for 
understanding some basic factors affecting the dynamics of productivity and distribution, 
particularly at the level of individuals and households. Our study is an attempt to fill this 
gap by using survey data at that level. 
 
 
V. Economic Insecurity and Vulnerability among Workers in Urban Poor 
Households. 
  
In this section, we empirically examine the nature and extent of job precariousness and 
income volatility among workers in the urban poor neighborhoods of  Bolivia and 
Ecuador’s largest cities. The empirical investigation consists of two parts: a) brief 
description of the total household sample and the profile of  head and spouse respondents; 
and b) a gendered analysis of the informalization of employment among men and women 
respondents in couples (or dual adults) households. We focus on the latter subsample  
(comprised of couples households only) in our investigation of the regressive process of 
redistribution and the concommitant  dynamics of informality of jobs to highlight the 
interconnectedness of job precariousness and gendered relations. Specifically, we adopt a 
gendered approach in  examining the link between gender-based roles and relations with 
worker vulnerability.  
 
While vulnerability is defined in a number of ways (Sebstad and Cohen 2001), we  
consider it in terms of  the household and its members’ ability to deal with risk and hence 
their attitude towards it. Risk or the chance of income decline or loss generated by  “low 
sales” or “slow work contract” season, leads to  concerns regarding particular 
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functionings including being nourished,  sheltered, educated, and cared for in times of 
illness. This translates into such commonplace concerns as being able to afford school 
fees for children, to seek medical assistance when  ill and even to pay for marriages,   
funerals and other social activities. Vulnerability relates to the claims or rights over 
resources in dealing with risk, shocks and economic stresses. The less claims or rights 
over resources a household or an individual has, the greater is her or his vulnerability.  
 
The mere existence of employment does not define the economic status and ability of the 
worker to function in the capability space.  It needs to be seen as acting together with a 
number of other factors, the most crucial being access to and control over other resources 
– social services provisioning, credit, other assets or different forms of social protection – 
in the face of income shortfalls and consumption expenditure shocks. As the following 
discussion will demonstrate, there is strong propensity for households with irregular and 
variable sources of income to become increasingly differentiated. There is also a 
tendency for risk burden  to be shouldered unequally among household members.  
 
 
A. Characteristics of Household Samples in Bolivia and Ecuador 
 
Our analysis of the vulnerability faced by households makes use of  the urban sample 
surveys conducted in May-September 2002 among  370 urban poorBolivian and Ecuador 
households and their members respondents.  Several low-income communities of  La Paz, 
El Alto and Santa Cruz in Bolivia and of Quito and Guayaquil in Ecuador were selected 
to provide  representation of the diversity of urban poor neighborhoods in the largest 
metropolitan areas in both countries.13 The households in these communities were 
randomly selected from a purposive community list of households  with at least one 
household member (household head or spouse) engaged in home-based or other self-
employed, informal sector work.14  
  
 
                                                 
13 The diversity of low-income neighborhoods in the metropolitan cities can take the form of old versus 
newly settled areas, proximity to or distance from main city centers, density of population, and  the degree 
of social cohesion represented by the presence or paucity of  grassroots organizations.  It is also important 
to note that the community selection for the survey took into account the presence of contact such as a local 
community organization or a community-based researcher   familiar with the area. This facilitated the 
“entry” of  the survey team in  the area. In this way, there was some degree of trust and initial rapport 
established with the household respondents. 
 
14 A total of 203 households in Ecuador were interviewed in 2002.  About eighty (80) households in 
Guayaquil (Bastion Popular neighborhood) were selected and  one hundred twenty three (123) in Quito 
(Solanda, Ex-Combastista, Lucha de los Pobres and Itchimbia neighborhoods). In the case of Bastion 
Popular, a community of more than 80,000 inhabitants in Guayaquil, two out of twelve zones were first 
chosen, and then the sample selection was implemented in the two zones. Independent questionnaires were 
required for both the household head and spouse.  In several cases, either the head or spouse could not be 
located for interviewing purposes. In 9 other cases, one of the household respondents withdrew for varied 




Of the total household sample, about 8% (15) and 28% (53) are female headed in Bolivia 
and Ecuador respectively, 10% (18-19) were headed by a single adult (male); the 
majority however were dual adult (couple) households (see Appendix A).15  
 
A proportion of de facto female headed households in Ecuador and Bolivia has resulted 
from  the male head  migrating to another city or  even country. International labor 
migration has been an important exhaust valve and in the period 1998-2000 in both 
countries. In Ecuador, about 200,000 Ecuadorians (about 2% of the total labor force) left 
the country in search of better job opportunities.  
 
A number of workers in our sample seem to have either a shifting status or are employed 
in varied forms of work arrangements, depending on the number of employers  (including 
themselves or a family member) they work for a given time period. Table 1shows that a 
very small proportion of the head and spouse sample did not work at all in the past 
month. While the majority are engaged in one type of work arrangements, about 10% and 
8% of female and male heads of households respectively reported having  worked  in two 
jobs; another 6% of women head work in at least three jobs.  
 
 
[ Table 1 about here.] 
 
 
The majority of the primary jobs represent self-employed economic activities, 
characterized by a particular type of precariousness as will be shown later on Table 1  
also shows that  a significant proportion of men workers in the sample households who 
are employed as permanent or regular workers, either in the public or private sector, 
compared to women workers. Some men in the household sample, mainly artisans or 
manual workers, have a temporary or casual status. The shortness of their work contracts 
(mostly on a day-to-day basis) demonstrates the instability and the extent to which their 
livelihood is at the mercy of their employers.   
 
 
B: Gender Dimensions in the Informalization of Employment: The Case of Couples 
Household Subsample  in Ecuador and Bolivia 
 
 
This section examines the varied dimensions of informalizaiton associated with the 
overall regressive process of distribution and the weakening of bargaining power of labor 
relative to capital. Using information collected from 484 women and men respondents in 
242 couple households in the Ecuador and Bolivia sample survey data, we focus on 
information related to our conceptual framework, particularly in terms of: a) measuring 
what we call “degrees of informality”;  b) job insecurity and lack of social protection; and 
                                                 
15 The definition of household head is made by the respondents themselves in the interview. This is likely 
to change if (de facto) headship is defined by the main or primary income earner of the household. 
Calculations from the Encuesta Condiciones de Vida (ECV) of Bolivia shows that the percentage of 
female-headed household increased from 24 to 30% during the period 1995-1999.  
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c) earnings and income variability. Overall, this analysis provides a preliminary 
exploration on the characteristics of the informal workers; it represents a step towards 
developing a methodology for identifying and monitoring the levels and patterns of 
various forms of insecurity, with implications for policy and action.     
    
i) Degrees of informality 
 
Ideally, an empirical analysis of increasing labor flexibilization  involves pertinent time-
series data that reflect temporal changes  in the pattern of employment of  workers. 
Unfortunately, such statistics do not exist to this date. Our survey data provide, however, 
information on the spatial job arrangements of urban respondents living in the low-
income neighborhoods of the following cities: El Alto and La Paz in Bolivia and Quito 
and Guayaquil in Ecuador.  The survey questionnaire records  information not only on 
the main job but also at any secondary and tertiary jobs undertaken by the respondent in 
the past five-six months. To highlight the interconnection between informalization, 
vulnerability and gender relations, the subsample used  in the following analysis include 
only heads and their spouses in couple (two-adult) households with and without 
dependents in both countries 
 
A simple measure of job informality is introduced in this paper. For purposes of 
simplicity,  a job is classified  as having  low, medium or severe/high degree of 
informality based on the regularity and stability of  employment. Formal jobs or those 
with low degree of informality refer to those that are regular and stable. These include 
employment in private firms (e.g. bank, hospital) and in government (police force, 
municipal office) as well as self-employed jobs that a person has steadily held for over 60 
months. Medium informal jobs refer to those that self-employed persons have for less 
than 60 months as well as wage employment or piece-rate work for private 
individual/contractor involving labor contracts with a time period of over two years.  
Highly informal or severely precarious employment refers to formal and informal jobs 
classified as temporary or casual, self-employed jobs that involve working for others (e.g. 
private contractor)  and wage-contracted, piece-rate jobs involving work contracts with a 
time period  of less than two years. Table 2 shows that among those employed, roughly 
95% and 79% of the sample living in urban, low-income areas of Bolivia and Ecuador 
respectively have main jobs that are moderate or severely informal. It is also worth noting 
that women workers tend to have relatively more precarious jobs  than men in both 
countries. 
 
The relationship between the informal character of the job and worker vulnerability is not  
straight forward however. The categorization of employment  by degree of informality of 
a worker is  made complicated by the fact that, with the decline in economic and job 
security, workers tend to engage in more than one job.  This multi-job dimension of the 








Nearly a third of women  respondents and a fifth  of  men respondents in the Bolivia 
sample hold more than one job (Table 3). The proportion is less in the case of women and 
men respondents in Ecuador, however. The multi-job dimension for many workers in 
Bolivia shows a  coping mechanism that serves as a buttress against  job and income 
insecurity. 
 
[Table 3 about here.] 
 
 
Informalization highlights the ability of capital to diminish the power of labor in a subtle 
manner. In having  the owner of labor take responsibility for his/her own survival and 
reproduction,  a worker who faces either  job loss or work below subsistence wage finds 
additional means for his/her survival in the informalized and unprotected working 
conditions thus increasing worker vulnerability. This is the case for many workers in the 
urban, poor communities of Bolivia and Ecuador whose work arrangement reflects their  
movement between formal and informal sectors of the economy.  In our sample, only 
about 18-20% of urban workers in  the low-income communities have formal jobs  and 
they are predominantly men. The majority (about 77% and 60% of Bolivia and Ecuador 
sample respondents) are  engaged in both formal as well as informal jobs as suggested in 
our conceptual framework.{see Appendix C). This is more the case for women than men. 
Thus, the data typify the high level of fluidity regarding the movement in and out of jobs 
of different characteristics, but predominantly between informalized work. 
 
More evidence of the fluidity of the movement of workers between the formal and 
informal sectors is the combined work patterns of heads and spouses in households.  
Intrahousehold arrangements may be such that the subsistence and maintenance of a 
worker engaged in the formal sector requires another household member to engage in an 
income-earning activity, but this time in the informal sector. Table 5 shows the varied 
work patterns in which both heads and spouses in the subsample households are engaged. 
 
About 23% of the urban, low-income households in Bolivia and Ecuador have only one 
working head or spouse. In the case of Bolivia, many of them are engaged in highly 
informal jobs. More than one third of the household sample have both head and spouse 
working  in moderately informal jobs. About  25%  and 22 % of  households in Bolivia 
and Ecuador respectively have one worker engaged in a  formal job and his/her partner in 
at least one informal job. The table shows that for the majority of urban, low-income 
workers,  informalized and insecure employment characterizes their participation in the 
labor force as shown in Table 4. 
 







ii) Job insecurity and virtual absence of social protection 
 
An important consequence of labor market flexibilization is the  individualization of 
labor contracts --as mentioned in section III of the paper,. This is reflected in the 
proportion of workers who are fully or partially self employed. Table 5 shows that  161 
and 143  workers in Bolivia and Ecuador respectively  classify themselves as self 
employed workers, more than 90% of whom are partially self employed. The latter refers 
to those persons who work for others (e.g for other households, contractor, middleman) 
yet decide on  their own work time and location of work while also providing their own 
tools and materials. They are not fully self employed in the sense that they do not have 
full control over the production process. Partially self employed workers also refer to 
those who hold two jobs, one of which involves working for themselves.  
 
 
[Table 5 about here.] 
 
 
Although both Bolivia and Ecuador have adopted trade and financial market 
liberalization policies since the late eighties, this has not resulted in substantial foreign 
capital inflows and export growth. The level of industrialization remains low and uneven 
and this has affected the structure of employment in both countries.  Bolivia has had 
much difficulty attracting foreign investment, even in low wage production. Although 
small scale domestic production exists such as in traditional crafts, furniture, shoes, 
leather and garments, some of them have suffered from the arrival in the country of large 
amounts of second-hand products, mostly from the US, which have invaded informal 
markets.  In Ecuador, the predominant type of employment is self-employment, 
particularly among women in the urban, poor communities, in the form of vending and 
production of goods and services for sale in the domestic economy.  
 
The general absence of labor and social protection among the workers can be seen in the 
subsample and is reflected in Table 5. Only a very small proportion of the total men and 
women worker respondents receive social security benefits, predominantly male workers 
in the case of Ecuador. This clearly indicates the high degree of risk and insecurity that 
permeate the lives of these households; their needs and interests are not addressed nor 
included in legislation and programs that cover employer-employee relationship and 
collective bargaining, education and training systems and working conditions  
 
 
iii) Earnings and income variability 
 
The average household income in the sample of self-employed couple households is not   
the lowest in Bolivia and Ecuador. However, the variability of income is  very high (see 
Table 6). This is even more the case in the case of piece-rate contracted workers, 
especially in Bolivia (see Table 7) thus implying that homework and the continuous 
combinations of jobs with various degrees of informality represent survival strategies but 
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at the cost of high risk and vulnerability.   
 
 




   Table B-8    
       
 
  
Table 6 shows that, among self-employed workers, women earn less on average than that 
of men although they also report less hours of market work.  The earnings of piece-rate 
contracted workers in both Ecuador and Bolivia are even lower,  especially when taking 
into account their hourly rate as shown in Table 7.  The reported total individual work 
earnings and length of paid work time for all women and men respondents in the 
subsample are given in Table 8. Overall, women earn less income than men in both 
Bolivia and Ecuador; the earnings gap being larger in Ecuador. On average, women 
engage in paid work for 42-45 hours per week while men work about 12-15 hours longer.  
This does not take into account however, the time spent in household and childcare work 
activities, which are much longer in the case of women.  
 
 
[Table 8 about here.] 
 
 
Given the unsteady and irregular character  of many work contracts (if they are wage 
workers)or the enterprises (if they are self-employed), it is not surprising that  the 
incomes of these workers vary considerably.  Table 9 provides evidence of income 
variability in terms of the range of fluctuations in the monthly incomes of workers.  The 
first set of numbers provides a snapshot of the variation in earnings relative to what is 
perceived by the respondent as normal level of earnings. Although half of the respondents 
sample reported their past monthly earnings to be average, about 50%  and 39% of 
respondents in Bolivia and Ecuador respectively perceived their previous monthly 
earnings to be low or below average, particularly among women workers. 
 
The extent of fluctuations in work earnings also vary from worker to worker. In several 
cases, income can dip to as much as  a tenth  of what is earned during “high” profit 
periods. Fluctuations in income and increased uncertainty can alter considerably the 
decision making process and allocational patterns. More importantly, extreme variations 
and greater uncertainty in income can present an acute threat to people’s survival even if, 
on average, incomes may be high enough to maintain a minimal standard of living.  
 
 
[Table 9 about here.] 
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We have developed an income variability index to better measure the fluctuation in 
income earnings. This is calculated as the absolute value of the ratio of the weighted 
difference of the incomes during high and low earnings periods to the total sum of the 
weighted incomes between high and low earnings periods or: 
 
 
             
| Zvar    =   abs     │ [(Ylow  x  Tlow   ) - [(Yhigh  x  Thigh   )]    │ 
      | [(Ylow  x  Tlow   ) + [(Yhigh  x  Thigh   )]    | 
  
 
where             Zvar    = income variability index which ranges from 0-1. 
                        Ylow    = ave monthly income during low earnings period 
               Ylhigh   = ave monthly income during high earnings period 
Tlow  =  number of days/months considered to be “low earnings period”   
Thigh  =  number of days/months considered to be “high earnings period”   
 
 
The results are given in table 9 as well. A higher index  (closer to 1) reflects higher 
variability of income while a lower value (closer to 0) means less variability. Workers in 
Bolivia overall seem to experience greater fluctuation in their income levels compared to 
those in Ecuador. Women workers in both countries however, experience greater 
variability as reflected in the higher income variability indices compared to that of men. 
 
Income variability further heightens the household’s need to find ways of smoothing their 
consumption and design survival strategies. Coping strategies among the poor have 
received much attention in the literature on economic and financial crises in the recent 
decade. It has become evident that low money incomes represent only one facet of human 
deprivation experienced by the poor and vulnerable groups in Ecuador; intensification of 
non-paid work is, for example, another important facet. 
 
The majority of households in our Ecuador sample have adjusted to  their generally low 
and variable work earnings by reducing food consumption, utilities, delaying medical 
attention, especially for women and children,  borrowing, and even in the withdrawal of 
children from school. The insecurity of the informal work environment has therefore far-
reaching effects and further induces vulnerability of workers and their households as a 
whole. .Recent studies on the effects of negative shocks or crises on poor households 
show the critical role of informal credit in consumption smoothing and in managing 
losses from shocks such as family emergencies (Boris and Prugl 1996, Boonmathya et al 
1999, Sebstad and Cohen 2001) Our study shows that women workers tend to  borrow 
more than male workers, mainly to meet their household consumption as well as 
educational and other expenses related to children.  
 
In some cases, both men and women workers have made use of their assets, especially 
jewelry, livestock and appliances as buffer stocks to smoothen their consumption in the 
face of irregular income streams. As long as the household has positive saving, temporary 
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income shortfalls can be smoothed through dissaving. However, once the household’s 
past saving or wealth falls to near zero, the possibility of further smoothing shrinks and 
consumption can become quite volatile. This seems to be the case for several  households 
in our Ecuador sample  whose past savings and assets have been either used or depleted 
as a result of chronic income shortages. 
 
There can also be important effects on future income from job insecurity if the assets that 
are used to buffer current consumption from income fluctuations are themselves used in 
the production process15. Homebased workers who may need their own resources to pay 
for raw materials, equipment and other inputs in their job, can find themselves severely 
capital-constrained. As a result, their income in the next period would be lower or  more 
precarious as a consequence of the loss of assets.  
 
The resulting income variability also leads to spillovers into the social and economic 
spheres that affect the workers’ ability to manage risk. Not only can it affect the social 
cohesion associated with support systems, but it  can  also alter the fallback level of 
assets and savings. In the long run, it can also affect the vulnerability of later generations 
through withdrawal of children from school so that the cycle of poverty and capability 
deprivation is maintained.  This points to the importance of credit and ad hoc loans to 
deal with this vulnerability, in relationto both production and consumption .16 
 
A final point raised in the conceptual framework is that socially ascribed positions of 
workers also determine their vulnerability. This suggests the importance of taking into 
account the gender identities of these workers. The interconnectedness of women’s 
‘traditional’ role as care providers and their role as income earners highlights the 
interconnectedness of the workers’ productive and reproductive roles. This is an 
association that feminist analysis has underlined for a long time (Beneria and Roldan 
1987; Folbre 1994); this paper carries it a step further by providing much more detail 
about their multiple levels of connection. The extent to which the risk associated with 
market fluctuation and changes in demand conditions are absorbed by the household  
leads to more or less unequal work burden  among its members. In addition, the 
distribution of work burden within the household also depends on the interplay of gender 
norms and intra-household negotiations.   
 
The relationship between income and capability is affected by a plethora of factors such 
as asset ownership, educationl level, age, gender as well as parameters that are not easily 
measured nor observed including self-esteem. Whether a worker can translate his/her 
earnings into capability functioning critically depends on the intra-household  dynamics 
and decision making processes as well.  This raises the question of whether a worker’s 
contribution to household income translates into greater bargaining power. Table 10 lists 
several proxies or indicators of the relative position of the worker in the household 
decision making.  The survey data clearly shows that there are relatively more women 
respondents who say that they require permission to work from their partners/spouses 
                                                 
16 Credit patterns among the sample respondents in Ecuador are discussed further in Floro and Messier 
2004. 
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than men respondents.  There also seems to be little income pooling among households, 
particularly in Ecuador.  
 
[Table 10 about here.] 
 
 
Roughly the same proportion of women and men reported that they decide solely on the 
use of their own earnings. Another indicator of bargaining power is with respect to loan 
decisions. About 20 % of  women and men workers  in the Bolivian sample reported 
having made sole decision of when to borrow; the majority reported that this is a joint 
decision. The proportion of individual decision to obtain credit is much higher in the case 
of Ecuador, especially among men. But a different pattern emerges when it comes to  the 
question of who pays the loan or shoulders the burden of loan payment. A higher 
proportion of women respondents in both Bolivia and Ecuador sample reported  that they 
are solely responsible for loan repayment compared to the men respondents. 
 
The preceding discussion illustrates that any examination of vulnerability must also take 
into account the mechanisms through which gender roles, relative bargaining power and 
burden of  consumption smoothing of different household members are affected by the 
broader changes in labor market dynamics, degree of informalization and the 
accompanying variability in incomes.  Thus, labor market flexibilization and informality 
is associated with a high degree of income insecurity of and vulnerability typified by the 
poor urban households in our sample.   For women informal workers in particular, the 
resulting burden is reflected in their multiple roles, which they try to accomplish 
simultaneously within severe time constraints; it is also reflected in the manner by which 
they shoulder the responsibility for meeting loan payments as households attempt to 
smooth consumption.   
 
 
VI. Conclusions, Redistribution and Social Policy   
 
 
The preceding analysis of the 2002 survey sample data from Bolivia and Ecuador allows  
us to discuss with some empirical detail the different aspects underlined in our conceptual 
framework affecting the weakening of the bargaining power of labor relative to capital, 
with implications for our emphasis on distribution --in general and for home based 
workers in particular: 
 
First, we have illustrated that the extent to which the households in our surveys are 
subject to a high degree of informality, precariousness and vulnerability resulting from 
labor market flexibilization and unemployment.  
 
Second, these tendencies exercise a downward pressure on the bargaining power of labor, 
reinforced by the high fluidity of workers between the different levels of informality and 
the more formal activities. Likewise, the weakening of the labor contract has been 
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parallel to the increasing levels of informality and is illustrated by the prevalent absence 
of written or legal labor contracts among wage workers.  
 
Third, we show that the precariousness and variability of earnings found among the 
workers in the surveys illustrate how inequality shapes the bottom layers of income 
distribution in the two countries. Further, we find that the costs of informality imply 
longer hours of work and a high degree of vulnerability for workers and their households.    
 
Fourth, our data show that self-employed and wage-contracted workers have little access 
to capital and thus find it difficult to increase their productivity. This  points to the 
importance of credit policies for poor and vulnerable households but also to the need to 
focus on programs that will increase productivity in the informal economy. Finally, our 
data shows that gender is an important factor in the degree of worker vulnerability, in 
socially ascribed positions and in household decision making.  
 
In what follows, we discus some of the main avenues to be explored in terms of policy 
and action that could address theses issues, particularly in terms of home based workers 
but also in the case of informalized workers located at the bottom of the income 
hierarchy: 
 
1. Macroeconomic policies can make a significant contribution in generating 
employment, raising income levels, and affecting distribution between different social 
groups, including those affected by labor market informality (Heinz and Polin, 2002, 
Floro, Cagatay, Erturk and Willoughby 2003). This implies that these objectives can not 
be left to market forces alone. In Latin America, a new understanding of the role of 
government in channeling economic activity seems to be emerging after more than two 
decades of neoliberal policies. ECLA’s effort at providing a guide for “transformation 
with equity” presents an important effort at providing an alternative view, although a 
timid one in terms of breaking from the model prevailing in the region.  In Bolivia and 
Ecuador, it will be difficult to deal with current levels of poverty and with the need to 
stimulate growth without a guiding government hand beyond what ECLA’s calls for. As 
we argue below, this includes programs such as active labor market policies, employment 
creation programs, educational and training programs, and fiscal reforms. These 
interventions can range from greater access to credit and capital to skill enhancement 
programs and investment in infrastructure such as access to electricity for home based 
production (Heinz and Pollin, 2003).17 Unemployment programs and pension policies can 
also be seen as part of the range of measures with macroeconomic dimensions. All of 
these call for gender-aware macroeconomics policies. 
 
Our analysis clearly points to the importance of credit policy for poor and vulnerable 
households. A flexible and easily accessible credit and loans program can ease the 
pressure facing families, both in terms of their daily needs (consumption) as well as in 
                                                 
17 Heinz and Pollin point out that informal activities primarily composed of wage and pseudo-wage, such as 
with piece work, focusing on productivity to raise living standards might be less effective because 
productivity raises might be absorbed through profits. This in fact is pertinent to our emphasis on 
ownership; if workers own the productive resources they work with, they can capture raises in productivity. 
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terms of income generating activities (production). Increasing the access to mainstream 
financial services for poor households – such as short and medium-term consumption 
loans, insurance services, savings mobilization and technical assistance – can reduce their 
vulnerability resulting from variations in income. This calls for innovative financial 
instruments that provide these services while reducing the cost of credit. Such financial 
policies and credit programs can enhance productive capacity and affect distributive 
channels (Floro 2001).  They require, however, complementary legal frameworks that 
effectively eliminate the discrimination and biases of financial institutions in serving the 
poor and women. In particular, a credit policy targeting productivity increases can 
provide the base for rising earnings for informal workers at different levels of the income 
scale. 
 
3.  Our study allows us to see a close connection between informality and the changing 
landscape of cities. Urban spaces in the cities included in our study have been highly 
affected by the dramatic increase in street vending and also, although less visibly, by 
informal production. La Paz for example is the quintessential informal city crowded with 
street vendors in the downtown areas, while El Alto tends to concentrate a large number 
of microenterprises often liked to living spaces. Santa Cruz, on the other hand, has a 
concentrated area of street vending in the center, with informal production expanding in 
the wide spaces available in its outskirts.18 This suggests the need to include urban policy 
as an integral part of any policy dealing with poor households working in informalized 
settings. For example, productivity levels  in small firms, often located next to living 
spaces in poor areas, could increase with different types of infrastructure investment,  
such as the pavement of streets and sidewalks, that would make delivery service more 
efficient. The same can be said for greater access to water and electricity and the 
improvement of basic services delivery in these areas, such as garbage collection, urban 
transport and even health centers.  
 
4. Our study also points to the importance of rethinking social protection program for 
workers laboring in informalized settings. By way of a conclusion and without providing 
an elaboration, we briefly list here the different possible avenues for action being 
discussed in different circles, particularly those which would contribute to dealing with 
poverty and redressing regressive tendencies in the distribution of income and resources 
in the informal economy. Rather than discussing their feasibility for the cases of Bolivia 
and Ecuador, we include a brief list here as a basis for further discussion: 
 
a. Universal basic income programs provide for everyone some minimum level of 
income not tied to work. The objective is to avoid a welfarist approach addressing 
only the most poor and therefore tending to segregate and stigmatize a portion of 
the population. Such programs have been discussed in many circles that include 
individual authors, institution, and governments. A universal grant was proposed 
for example in South Africa after an evaluation of policy options completed in 
March 2002 to address severe levels of poverty. Some authors view basic income 
programs as a key factor to provide a minimum amount of economic security in a 
globalized world that needs a new social contract. The discussion of these 
                                                 
18 For more detail, see Beneria and Schaller, 2002 and work in progress. 
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programs is much more prevalent –in theory and practice— in Western Europe 
than in other regions (November and Standing 2002; Standing, ed. 2003). 
However, it is not unknown in Latin America and it has been quite prominent in 
specific countries such as Brazil. The main difficulty in applying such programs 
in developing countries has to do with problems of funding. Our own view is that, 
despite its intentions to the contrary, such schemes are likely to generate two 
distinct social groups: those who only receive the minimum income and those 
who get extra income from their work and integration in the economy. This is 
unlikely to prevent the problems of stigmatization linked to welfarist approaches. 
Receiving income for work is easier to be accepted by those who tend to see 
welfare payments as a way of creating lazy workers. For the workers themselves, 
there can be satisfaction from earning an income from work. For these reasons, 
our preference lies on the side of employment creation programs to eliminate 
unemployment and the tying of income to work.  
 
b. Minimum wage policies present both promise as well as difficulties for 
informalized workers. To the extent that they can be implemented, they are likely 
to be one of the key instruments for rising incomes at the bottom and for dealing 
with inequality and gender equity –particularly given the prevalence of women in 
the sector. They are relatively easy to design and, in principle at least, to 
implement in all countries. Even when they are not totally effective, they tend to 
set “social expectations based on widespread knowledge of what the minimum 
wage is and clear social expectations that wages should not fall below this level” 
(Rubbery 2003). This is the distributional effect of minimum wage policies. In 
Ecuador and Bolivia, the need to increase minimum wages seems practically 
without dispute given its enormous decrease, in real terms, during the past two 
decades; if the 1980 real minimum wage is taken to be 100, in Bolivia it had 
decreased to 31.2 in 1990, raising to 58.0 in 1995; in Ecuador, the corresponding 
figures were 36.2 in 1990 and 44.4 in 1995 (Grimshaw and Miozzo 2004). On the 
other hand, the opposition to minimum wage policies, widely supported especially 
by employers and many economists, springs from their assumed employment 
effect, based on the possibility that higher minimum wages might result in fewer 
jobs and increase unemployment. An extensive literature on this subject exists and 
the academic debate, dominated by economists, has tended to emphasize the 
negative effects. Yet, as Rubbery points out, even the most skeptical academics 
have found that these effects are relatively weak. In addition, these debates often 
ignore the positive effects that an increase in minimum wages can have on the 
sectors that benefit from the demand resulting from income increases. To be sure, 
in a globalized world minimum wage policies might result in disincentives for 
investment in countries where they are implemented. This calls for a global 
approach to minimize this type of competition across countries so as to create an 
even playing field. 
 
c. The debates on workers rights and international labor standards are subject to 
similar arguments. During the post-WWII period, important progress was made in 
setting targets and reaching agreements, particularly through the work of the ILO 
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and through other avenues such as the pressures exercised by the environmental 
movement. However, in recent decades the market fundamentalism introduced 
through neoliberal policies and reinforced by globalization has eroded many of 
the gains, and it has often reduced regulations on workers rights and labor 
standards to ineffectual instruments, leaving these standards to the functioning 
and requirements of the market.  For workers in informalized settings and more 
specifically for home workers, the difficulty of implementing such standards are 
well known. Yet, this in not an argument against their existence. As in the case of 
minimum wages, they can play the role of setting targets that increase the 
bargaining power of workers. Some authors, including those who speak on behalf 
of workers, have opposed such standards based on the fear that they induce 
multinational capital to leave the countries adopting labor standards or prevent 
new capital to move in (Kabeer 2003). In our view, this problem requires a global 
approach that encompasses all workers including those with informalized 
employment; but it is not an argument against rights and labor standards. An 
approach that is inclusive of all workers will require collective action and active 
agency of informal and homebased workers in ensuring that labor standards apply 
to them as well. 
 
d. Institutional approaches that facilitate the access of workers to resources and their 
participation in decision making are varied and often overlooked. For example, 
the organization of individual workers and/or households into cooperatives can 
expand their horizons in many directions (marketing, information, access to 
technical inputs and to different kinds of networks, etc.). This might require help 
with leadership and technical knowledge but it’s not necessarily an expensive 
form of aid. Cooperatives and workers associations can also foster savings and 
loans programs, and facilitate different forms of labor protection; they seem to 
have been instrumental in helping many workers survive the economic crisis in 
Argentina and in Thailand (Antonopoulos and Floro 2004). As is well known, an 
important example of workers association is that of SEWA, an association of 
home based workers that has grown from a membership 3,850 workers in 1975 to 
almost 219,000 in 1995. SEWA has also its own bank and it has design a variety 
of programs for the social protection of its members (Jhabwala, 2002). Similarly 
South Africa has witnessed the growth of StreetNet, a street vendors workers 
association which has learned much from SEWA. Campaigns for the registration 
of homebased workers can open up possibilities for social protection for them, 
dealing with their deep-rooted invisibility, and increase their bargaining power 
(Lazo 1996). A different approach is represented by programs that foster access to 
resources such is the case with the Bolsa-escola programs created in 1997 in 
Brazil which give grants to families that send their children to school.19 
Evaluations of these programs point out their positive impact on poverty 
reduction, family income (other than cash aid itself), and on children’s school 
performance (Lavinas et al 2001).  
 
                                                 
19 It can be argued that these programs are closer to basic income programs than to an institutional 
approach. 
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The policies listed here are not exclusive of each other, nor do they deal with questions of 
ownership raised in our conceptual framework –except for our mention of cooperatives. 
Some might be more appropriate in some countries than in others, depending on their 
labor market structure, fiscal policy, and other factors. For Bolivia and Ecuador’s home 
based and informalized workers, many of the policies listed here seem relevant and thus 
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Main Job Characteristics of Workers in Sample Households,   




 ECUADOR BOLIVIA 
 
 Women Men Women Men
  
I. Job Status2 
 
    
a) Permanent/Regular 18 (12.1) 38 (28.8) 13 (8.7)   32 (19.5) 
 
b) Temporary/Casual 10 (.6.7) 21(15.9) 13(8.7)    20 (12.2) 
 
    c) Self-Employed 124 (82.3) 80(59.6) 124(82.7) 112((68.3) 
 
    d) Other 1(1.0)  1(0.7) 0   0 
 




6 (4.1)   14 (10.6) 0    3(1.8) 
    b) Private Firm/Private  
               Individual      
14 (9.4) 37(28.0) 25(16.7)  48(29.3) 
    c) Cooperative 8(5.3) 1(0.7) 1(0.6)   1(0.6) 
 
    d) Self  124 (83.2) 80(60.6) 124 (82.7) 112(68.3) 
 




1 Some of the women (spouse) respondents declined to answer the question. Others were unpaid family 
workers and did not answer the rest of the employment questions. 
 
2.  This refers to their primary or main job only.  Note the presence o f public sector workers  and  other 
formal sector workers in the Ecuador sample.  The majority of them  were spouses of informal sector 
workers. Percentages may not round up to 100 due to rounding. 
 
Table 2 
Employment Pattern  of Urban Workers in Sample Households, by Sex  
                                  (Percent of Total in Parentheses) 
 
       
  BOLIVIA   ECUADOR  
 






















A. No of 
Employed 1
  
       
1. Formal/Low    0 (0) 10 (8)  10  (4) 10 (11) 34 (30)   44  (21) 
 
2.Medium  93 (84) 92 (79) 185 (81) 60 (66)    52 (46) 113 (54) 
3. 
High/Severe  
17 (16) 15 (13)  32 (14) 22 (24)    29 (25)  51 (25) 
 






























 ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ 
 

















1. The following categories are defined as follows: 
a) Formal/Low degree of informality refers to jobs which are classified as regular, whether they 
are in the formal or informal sector. These include employment in private firms (e.g. bank, 
hospital) and in government (police force, municipal office) as well as self-employed jobs that a 
person has steadily held for over 60 months.  
b) Medium informal employment refers to those self-employed (formal or informal) jobs a person 
has for less than 60 months,  regular  jobs for private individual/contractor, and wage.contracted, 
piecerate jobs involving work contracts with a time period  of over two years. 
c) Highly informal employment refers to  formal and informal jobs classified as temporary or 
casual, self-employed jobs that involve working for others (e.g. private contractor)  and wage-
contracted, piecerate  jobs involving work contracts with a timeperiod of less than two years. 
 
2. Not employed refers to all heads or spouses who did not look for work in the previous month. 




Number of Jobs held byHeads and Spouses  in Couple Households, by Sex                    
(Percent of total in parentheses) 
 
 
       




Women       Men              All 
 
Women Men  All 






   9  (7%)  25 (10%) 
 
 1 (1%) 
 
   2 (2%) 
 
   3 (1%) 
       
One 87 (69%) 102 (81%) 189 (75%) 82 
(88%) 
105 (90%) 187(80%) 
       
Two 19 (15%)  15 (12%)    34 (13%) 9 (10%)    9 (8%)  18 (8%) 
       
More than 
Two  
 4 (3%)   0  (0%)   4  (2%)  1  (%)   0 (0%)   1 (0%) 
 

















     Table 4 
 
Combined Employment Classification of Head and Spouse in Urban  Households, 
 by Degree of Informality of Jobs and by Sex 






  Combined Employment  
Classification by 
Household 




A. Households with Both 




 1 ( 1) 
 
 
 1 (1) 
   
B. Households with One 
Working Head or 
Spouse 
  
   1. Formal/Low  9  (7) 14 (12) 
   2. Medium Informal                   0 12 (10) 
    3.Highly Informal 20 (16)  1  (1) 
 _____ _____ 
 Subtotal 25 (23) 27 (23) 
   
C. Households with both 




    1. Formal/Low  Only 9 (  7)    4  (3) 
     2.Formal and 
Informal 
32 (25) 25  (22) 
     3.Moderate Informal 
Only                    
45 (36) 44  (38) 
     4. Highly Informal 
Only 
14 (11) 16  (14) 
 _______ ______ 
                             
Subtotal 
100 (79) 89  (77) 
   
              ALL 
HOUSEHOLDS 





Access to Benefits by Workers in Bolivia and Ecuador   Sample,  
By Type of Benefit and By Sex 
(Percent of total in parenthesis) 
 
 
 BOLIVIA  ECUADOR  
     
By Type of 
Benefit 






























































     
 
1. These are for workers who answered the question. Several left the question of 




Monthly  Earnings and Length of Market Work Time of Self Employed 
Urban Workers in Couple Households, by Sex 
(Earnings are in US dollars) 
 
  BOLIVIA   ECUADOR  
       
 Women Men All Women Men  All 
  
 
     
Average Monthly 
Earnings1









4.4 6 5.3 6.6 8.9 7.5 
 
1. Refer to both full and partial self-employed 
2. Monthly earnings are estimated as net profits reported by the respondent. In those 
cases whereby the self-employed, survey respondent was unable to  calculate his/her 
expenses and revenues; their net profits are treated as missing. Reported net profits are 
for the past month only.  
Table 7 
 
                Earnings of PiecerateContracted Urban Workers in Couple 
Households, 




  BOLIVIA   ECUADOR  
       
 Women Men All Women Men  All 
 N=9 
 

































1. Refers to those employed in the informal sector only.  Note that not all those in this category in 
Bolivia were able to recall or calculate their earnings nor the amount of time it took them to 
perform the job. Thus, these cases are missing. 
 
 2 .Recent earnings  refer to the most recent payment (total ) received by the wage/contracted 
worker. The reference time period varies from contract to contract but the total (own labor) hours 
worked for the pay was asked. 
 
Table 8 
Total Work Income and Length of Market Work Time of  Urban Workers in 
Couple Households, by Sex 
(Earnings  in US dollars) 
 
 
  BOLIVIA   ECUADOR  
       
 Women Men All Women Men  All 
 N=126 
 

































































1. Monthly total income is income earned for both primary and secondary jobs  jobs  of each person.  
 
2. Total hours work refers to time spent in all paid work activities. Note that in a few cases, some 
respondents reported as much as 116 hours of work per week.  
Table 9 
Earnings Variability of Self Employed Urban Workers in Subsample 
Households, by Sex 




  BOLIVIA   ECUADOR  




















     
  a) Low  55  47 50 43 32 39 
   b) High  15   5 9 10 8 9 


















































































1. Reported monthly earnings is for the previous month. 
2. The earnings variability index  is  discussed in the text.; a higher index (closer to 
one) means higher variability; a lower one (closer to zero) means more stable 




Patterns of Household DecisionMaking and Bargaining in 




Proportion of  Respondents  
(in %) 
Proportion of  Respondents  
(in %) 
 
 Women Men  Women Men  
1. Requires 









2. Decides on use 













3. Decides jointly 


















































Composition and Average Incomes of All Households  
in Bolivia and Ecuador Urban Sample, 
 by Headship,1 
(Monthly Income in US dollars) 
 
 
    











           Female 15 53 
           Male 18 19 
 
B.  Number of Dual 









   
 
Total Households 180 190 
















  1  Spouse  can be a legal or common law wife or husband, or the ascribed partner of the household head. 
The status, as with household headship, is defined by the respondents themselves. 
 
2 Gross monthly household income (in US dollars) referred to that in the past month. It includes income 
from work (wages, gross profits) earned by household members, remittances, cash gifts, rental income, 
other private income sources (lending, gambling),  pension, sickness/disability benefits, social security, 
insurance or provident allowances, childcare allowances, family allowances, unemployment benefits, and 
other government benefits.  Calculations are based on the Bolivia’s exchange rate as of August 2002:  7.22 




Summary Characteristics of Head and Spouse Members of All Households in 
Ecuador and Bolivia Sample, 
By Sex and Position in Household ).
 
 
                        BOLIVIA 
 









Mean Age (in 
years)  
 
38.2 36.8 39.9 36.7
  
Mean Years of  
Schooling  
 
6.4 6.8 9.5 8.6
Ave Work 
Hours in Main 
Job (per week) 
 
42.4 44.4 57.4 49.1
 
Length of Work 
Experience (no 
of months  in 
Main Job) 
 
101.5 57.4 141.7 64.5
 ECUADOR  
 



















     
2. Average 
Years at School 
9.5 9.3 10.1 9 
3. Ave Work 
Hours in Main 




























Number and  Proportion of Urban Workers in Couple Households,  
by Type of Work Arrangement and by Sex 




  BOLIVIA   ECUADOR  
By Type of Work 
Arrangement1 
Women Men All Women Men All 
   






































































117 (100) 227 (100) 93 (100) 115 (100) 208 (100) 
       
 
1. Work arrangement classification takes into account the degree of informality of 
each job held by a worker. It can be noted that a worker can have two or more 
jobs that belong to different job type (in terms of degree of informality). 
 
 
 
